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MARITIME DRUG SMUGGLING CONSPIRACIES:
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR IMPORTATION AND
DISTRIBUTION
Federal prosecutors frequently use conspiracy charges to prose-
cute participants in drug smuggling operations because these
charges avoid deficiencies in statutory schemes1 and afford the
prosecution significant procedural and evidentiary advantages.2
Recently, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits have conflicted 3 concerning the evidence necessary
to convict the crew of a marijuana-laden vessel of conspiracy to
possess marijuana with the intent to distribute4 when the crew also
has been charged with conspiracy to import the marijuana."
In United States v. Michelena-Orovio,6 the Fifth Circuit held
that a jury may infer knowledge of and participation in a conspir-
acy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute from a crew
member's participation in an operation to import a large quantity
1. For example, when Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 801-969 (1982)), it inadvertently repealed the law which regulated drug-related activities
aboard United States vessels on the high seas. The resulting loophole forced prosecutors to
use conspiracy charges against drug smugglers apprehended on the high seas until the loop-
hole was closed ten years later. See H.R. RE.P. No. 323, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1979); Note,
High Seas Narcotics Smuggling and Section 955a of Title 21: Overextension of the Protec-
tive Principle of International Jurisdiction, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 688 (1982); infra notes 15,
130-31 and accompanying text.
2. For example, one commentator noted that by using conspiracy charges in drug smug-
gling cases "the defendant may be tried jointly with his criminal partners, the joint trial
may be held in a venue he never entered, and hearsay statements of other alleged conspira-
tors may be used to prove his guilt." Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61
CALIF. L. REv. 1137, 1140 (1973). A survey of prosecutors revealed that evidentiary advan-
tages often were the primary motivation for charging conspiracy when the substantive of-
fense had been attempted or completed. Prosecutors cited plea bargaining, the possibility of
longer sentences, and venue considerations as secondary motivations for charging conspir-
acy. Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 Gxo. L.J.
925, 942 (1977).
3. Compare United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1984), with United States
v. Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1605 (1984).
4. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846 (1982).
5. 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 963 (1982).
6. 719 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1605 (1984).
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of marijuana.7 Because the quantity involved obviously was more
than Michelena-Orovio and his fellow crew members could have
consumed themselves, the court reasoned that the crew members
knew the marijuana would be distributed after importation.' In ad-
dition, the crew members' knowledge of the conspiracy to dis-
tribute the marijuana followed from their understanding that the
economic success of importation depended on distribution of the
contraband.' The crew's involvement in the act of importation it-
self also supported the inference because the importation furthered
the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute.10
In United States v. Manbeck," the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit expressly rejected the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning in Michelena-Orovio.12 Although the court recognized
that the presence of a large quantity of marijuana indicated that
someone intended to distribute it, the court refused to allow the
jury to infer involvement in the distribution conspiracy without ev-
idence identifying the crew as the "someone" who intended to dis-
tribute the contraband.13 The Fourth Circuit reversed convictions
for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute because the crew
members' interest in and responsibility for the contraband termi-
nated when they completed the importation operation. 4
This split in interpretation means that identical conduct may vi-
olate the federal statute in one circuit but not the other. Because
drug smuggling organizations respond to changes in the law that
minimize the risk of conviction, the differing standards of proof for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute may encourage
smugglers to ply their trade in the area where the risks are less
7. Id. at 756-57.
8. Id. at 752. The defendant's vessel contained twelve tons of marijuana. Id. at 741, 752.
9. Id. at 752.
10. Id. The court's reasoning in Michelena-Orovio is examined in greater detail infra
notes 26-53 and accompanying text.
11. 744 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1984).
12. Id. at 390. The crew had imported approximately twenty-five tons of marijuana. Id. at
386.
13. Id. at 389.
14. Id. at 390. The court's reasoning in Manbeck is examined in greater detail infra notes
54-73 and accompanying text.
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severe. 15 The liberal attitude reflected in Manbeck could cause
smugglers to shift their activities to areas within the jurisdiction of
the Fourth Circuit.
This Note examines and compares the approaches of the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits. The analysis includes pertinent statutes, legis-
lative histories, and relevant case law from not only the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits but also other circuits that have addressed the
issue. The Note concludes that the Fifth Circuit's approach is su-
perior because it gives effect both to the plain meaning of the stat-
utory language and to the legislative intent.
THE COMPREHENSIVE DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONTROL ACT
OF 1970
The defendants in both Michelena-Orovio and Manbeck were
charged with violations of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Control Act of 1970,16 which was enacted in response to a
growing concern in the late 1960's with drug abuse and traffick-
ing.'7 The Act was a modification and consolidation of more than
fifty drug control laws into a comprehensive regulatory scheme., s
The Act created a "closed system," which requires importers to
15. The legislative history of the 1980 amendments to the drug control laws, for example,
reveals that the amendments were enacted to halt successful dismissals at preliminary hear-
ings by smugglers who rapidly had become aware of a loophole in the law. See H.R. REP'. No.
323, supra note 1, at 5. The loophole resulted when Congress inadvertently repealed the law
which prohibited possession of illegal drugs on the high seas. Because prosecutors could
charge high seas drug traffickers only with conspiracy to import, and they had difficulty
proving this charge, many cases were dismissed at the preliminary hearing stage. Id. at 4-5.
The loophole was closed in 1980. See Act of Sept. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 881, 955a-955d, 960, 962 (1982)); supra note 1 and
accompanying text; infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
16. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-969
(1982)).
17. See H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4566, 4567; Legislation to Regulate Controlled Dangerous Substances and
Amend Narcotics and Drug Laws, 1970: Hearings on H.R. 1444 Before the Subcomm. on
House Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 196 (1970) (statement of Richard Nixon, Pres-
ident of the United States) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
18. H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note 17, at 6, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 4571. The House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee drafted Titles I and
II of the Act, which include general domestic drug offenses such as the possession offenses.
See id. Title II is codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1982). The Senate Ways and Means
Committee drafted Title III, which regulates the importation and exportation of controlled
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register, at the time of importation, all controlled substances and
the ingredients necessary for their manufacture. After importation,
each transfer of controlled substances must be documented to fa-
cilitate monitoring of their movement. 19 Because unauthorized and
undocumented importation and distribution undermine the control
system, the success of the Act depends on the integrity of the
"closed system." 20
In both Michelena-Orovio and Manbeck, the defendants were
charged with two major violations of the Act.2' First, they were
charged with conspiracy to import a controlled substance into the
United States,22 which is punishable by a maximum of fifteen years
imprisonment, a fine of up to $25,000, or both. Second, they were
charged with conspiracy to possess marijuana with the intent to
distribute,2' which is punishable by a maximum of fifteen years
imprisonment, a fine of up to $125,000, or both, in cases like
Michelena-Orovio and Manbeck that involve more than 1,000
pounds of marijuana.25 The relationship between these two charges
constitutes the heart of the conflict between the two circuits.
THE CONFLICT
The Fifth Circuit Approach
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit de-
cided in Michelena-Orovio that a factfinder could infer from the
quantity of contraband that a defendant was guilty of conspiracy
substances. See id. Title III is codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 951-966 (1982). Because of this orga-
nizational set-up, the prohibitions of importation and distribution and the related conspir-
acy provisions appear in scattered sections of the Act. See supra notes 4-5.
19. H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note 17, at 25, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4590.
20. Id.
21. Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 366; Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d at 741.
22. Importation of controlled substances is prohibited by 21 U.S.C. § 960(a) (1982).
23. The punishment for importation of a controlled substance is set out in id. § 960(b). A
conspiracy to violate section 960 is punishable by the same penalty. See id. § 963.
24. Possession with intent to distribute is prohibited by id. § 841(a)(1).
25. The punishment for possession of more than 1,000 pounds of marijuana with intent to
distribute is set out in id. § 841(b)(6). A conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute is
punishable by the same penalty. See id. § 846.
The defendants in Manbeck also were charged with actual importation of marijuana in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960 (1982). 744 F.2d at 366.
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to possess contraband with the intent to distribute.26  In
Michelena-Orovio, federal agents infiltrated a drug smuggling op-
eration and learned of a planned high seas transfer of marijuana
from the defendant's vessel to vessels that would bring the mari-
juana ashore in Louisiana. Alerted to a description of this "mother
ship," the United States Coast Guard intercepted and boarded the
vessel approximately fifty miles south of the planned high seas
rendezvous point. Finding twelve tons of marijuana aboard, the
Coast Guard arrested the crew, including the defendant, a Colum-
bian national. The small size of the vessel, the large amount of ma-
rijuana aboard, and the marijuana's strong odor indicated that the
defendant knew marijuana was aboard.28 The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed Michelena-Orovio's conviction for conspiracy to import ma-
rijuana based not only on his knowledge that marijuana was
aboard, but also on the vessel's evasive tactics upon discovery, the
lack of fishing gear on what was purportedly a fishing vessel, and
the vessel's proximity to the rendezvous position at the time of its
interception by the Coast Guard.29  The court also upheld
Michelena-Orovio's conviction for conspiracy to possess marijuana
with the intent to distribute based on inferences drawn from the
nature and quantity of the cargo."0
26. 719 F.2d at 756-57. In coming to this conclusion, the court expressly overruled a con-
flicting line of authority. Id. at 743-46, 757. In United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th
Cir. 1978), and United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd on reh'g en
banc, 612 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1980), afl'd sub noma. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333
(1981), the Fifth Circuit had refused to permit juries to infer intent to distribute from the
defendants' participation in conspiracies to import large quantities of marijuana. Cadena,
585 F.2d at 1266; Rodriguez, 585 F.2d at 1247, aff'd in pertinent part, 612 F.2d at 908-09
n.3. In Cadena, the defendant had transferred marijuana to another vessel 200 miles south
of the Florida coast. The court held that the defendant had no interest in the marijuana
after he transferred it, and could not be held criminally liable for incidentially aiding the
distribution operation. Cadena, 585 F.2d at 1266. In Rodriguez, the defendants were crew
members on a vessel that contained contraband destined for the United States. The court
held that two of the crew members' peripheral participation in the importation scheme did
not establish that they intended to participate in the distribution operation. Rodriguez, 585
F.2d at 1247, aff'd in pertinent part, 612 F.2d at 908-09 n.3.
27. 719 F.2d at 741, 743. The defendant's vessel initially attempted to evade the Coast
Guard vessel, but eventually submitted to boarding and seizure. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 743.
30. Id. at 752.
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The court initially used these inferences to establish that a con-
spiracy to distribute must have existed. The Fifth Circuit noted
that drug distribution conspiracies generally are considered prime
examples of "chain conspiracies" because each participant depends
on the others for the venture's success.31 Both the illegal nature of
the goods and the crewman's role as a supplier implied that others
were involved in the scheme and thus that a conspiracy to dis-
tribute existed. In addition, the only rational purpose for import-
ing such a large quantity of marijuana could be distribution.2
Having found that a conspiracy to distribute existed, the court
turned to the central issue of whether a jury could infer a specific
defendant's participation in that conspiracy from his participation
in the accompanying conspiracy to import. The court refused to
rule out such an inference merely because Congress had enacted
two separate conspiracy statutes instead of one. The Fifth Circuit
noted that conviction under only one of the two separate conspir-
acy statutes, conspiracy to import, would result in less severe pun-
ishment for the defendant than conviction under the old single
conspiracy statute.33 This result would conflict with Congress' in-
tent in the 1970 comprehensive revision to the nation's drug laws
to make the "price for participation in this traffic ...prohibi-
tive." 4 The court also found that the defendant's participation in
a conspiracy to import marijuana, an illegal substance for which no
legal market exists, made him an actual participant in a segment of
31. Id. at 746. Chain conspiracy theory provides an analytical framework to determine
whether groups of persons engaged in related criminal activities may be found to have en-
gaged in a single continuous conspiracy or in several separate conspiracies. See United
States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939). If
a single conspiracy is found, a defendant's potential criminal liability is increased signifi-
cantly because the "acts of any conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy may be attrib-
uted to all participants." Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 393 (Russell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946)); see infra
note 70 and accompanying text. The procedural and evidentiary advantages that accrue to
the prosecution from conspiracy charges also are enhanced by the additional array of defen-
dants that results from a single chain conspiracy. Johnson, supra note 2, at 1140. Perhaps
the most significant advantage to the prosecution of a single conspiracy charge, however, is
that the hearsay statements of all other conspirators may be used to prove the defendant's
guilt. Id.
32. Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d at 748-49.
33. Id. at 748.
34. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note 17, at 10, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4575).
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the distribution scheme.35 Citing United States v. Falcone,"s and
Direct Sales Co. v. United States,3 7 the court reasoned that the
defendant obviously would not have imported the marijuana unless
plans existed for its distribution. 8 The lack of a legal distribution
system meant that the defendant must have had knowledge of the
conspiracy to distribute the contraband illegally. The defendant's
role in importing the marijuana thus established participation in
the conspiracy to distribute.39
The court rejected a contention that Direct Sales required pro-
longed buyer-seller cooperation to demonstrate a defendant's join-
der in a conspiracy. It discounted dicta in Direct Sales that a "sin-
gle or casual transaction" may fail to demonstrate that a supplier
had a tacit agreement with a buyer to whom he delivered contra-
band,40 stating that Direct Sales should not be read so narrowly. 41
35. 719 F.2d at 749.
36. 311 U.S. 205 (1940). In Falcone, the United States Supreme Court held that an indi-
vidual who knowingly had supplied legal items such as cans, sugar, and yeast to an individ-
ual who was making illicit distilled spirits had not conspired with others to distill the spirits
illegally. The Court held that the jury could not infer from the evidence that the defendant
knew a conspiracy existed, so the defendant could not have joined the conspiracy. Id. at 210.
The Court later interpreted Falcone as holding that an individual cannot become a party to
a conspiracy unless he knows of the conspiracy. Knowledge of the conspiracy in Falcone,
according to this interpretation, could not be inferred merely because the seller knew that
the buyer planned to use the goods for an illegal purpose. Direct Sales Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 703, 709 (1943).
37. 319 U.S. 703 (1943). In Direct Sales, a registered drug manufacturer and wholesaler
supplied large quantities of regulated drugs to a registered physician. The wholesaler en-
couraged sales by offering volume discounts. For several years, the physician illegally dis-
tributed the drugs he obtained from the wholesaler. Id. at 704-07. The United States Su-
preme Court held that during this prolonged course of conduct, the two parties had agreed
tacitly to conduct an illegal drug distribution scheme. Id. at 714. Because the item supplied
was a regulated substance, the Court concluded that the wholesaler knew of the physician's
illegal purpose. Id. at 711. The Court distinguished Falcone because the seller in that case
dealt in legal goods, and because a conspiracy between the buyer and seller was not charged
in Falcone. Id. at 709-11.
38. Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d at 750-51. The presence of more contraband than the
parties could consume allowed the court to infer an intent to distribute. Id. at 752.
39. Id. at 751-52.
40. Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 712 n.8. In Direct Sales, the parties had transacted their
business regularly for more than seven years. Id. at 705-06. The Court noted that, in certain
circumstances, a jury still cannot infer the intent necessary to support a conspiracy charge
even though the seller knew of the buyer's illegal purpose for buying restricted goods. An
example of such circumstances, according to the Court, would be
single or casual transactions, not amounting to a course of business, regular,
sustained and prolonged, and involving nothing more on the seller's part than
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The Fifth Circuit justified its interpretation by relying on a "single
act" theory,42 under which a single act can support an inference
that a defendant knew of and participated in a conspiracy if the
act's magnitude objectively demonstrated that the defendant knew
he was involved in a broad criminal enterprise.43 In Michelena-
Orovio, the defendant's participation in a plan to import twelve
tons of marijuana into the country clearly met the "single act" test,
and justified both the inference that the defendant knew of the
broader distribution plan and that he joined the plan by attempt-
ing the importation."
With this inference established, the court only had to dispose of
the defendant's claim that he was a "lowly non-English speaking
seaman" who neither knew nor cared what happened to the mari-
juana once it reached the United States.45 The court dealt with
this claim by noting that the statute prohibits not just distribution
to the ultimate consumer,46 but any distribution, including distri-
bution by actual delivery, constructive delivery, or attempted
transfer.4 7 Under this definition, any relocation of contraband from
one place to another is distribution. Congress defined distribution
broadly because Congress desired to monitor movement of con-
trolled substances.48 Following the statutory language, Congres-
sional intent, and previous cases in which similar arguments were
rejected,49 the Court held that Michelena-Orovio's status as a mere
indifference to the buyer's illegal purpose and passive acquiescence in his de-
sire to purchase, for whatever end. A considerable degree of carelessness cou-
pled with casual transactions is tolerable outside the boundary of conspiracy.
Id. at 712 n.8.
41. 719 F.2d at 750.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 751.
44. Id. at 752.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 753-54.
47. To "distribute," according to the statute, "means to deliver . . . a controlled sub-
stance." 21 U.S.C. § 802(11) (1982). "Delivery" includes "the actual, constructive, or at-
tempted transfer of a controlled substance." Id. § 802(8).
48. See 719 F.2d at 754.
49. E.g., United States v. Sockwell, 699 F.2d 213 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 936
(1983).
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employee did not weaken the inference that he participated in the
distribution conspiracy.50
The dissenting judge argued that the majority, by failing to con-
sider the element of intent necessary to prove distribution, effec-
tively destroyed the distinction between the separate statutory of-
fenses of importation and distribution.51 According to the dissent,
the evidence did not indicate that the crew had a stake in the
distribution scheme. To the contrary, the fact that the crew in-
tended to transfer the cargo on the high seas supported an infer-
ence that the crew's involvement and interest was to end before
distribution commenced.2 According to the dissent, the jury could
infer that the defendant joined in the conspiracy to distribute
under the Direct Sales doctrine only if the defendant had cooper-
ated on a prolonged, informed, and interested basis with a buyer.5 '
The Fourth Circuit Approach
In United States v. Manbeck,54 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit upheld conspiracy convictions for im-
portation but dismissed the conspiracy convictions of the crews of
two shrimping vessels for possession of marijuana with the intent
to distribute.5 5 The crew members were arrested at a port in South
Carolina after United States Customs agents intercepted their ves-
sels and escorted them to shore. The evidence at trial established
that, before the agents had intercepted the vessels, the crews had
navigated into United States territorial waters and had unloaded
twenty-five tons of marijuana, with the aid of a land-based crew,
50. 719 F.2d at 755.
51. See id. at 757 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 758 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
53. See id. at 758-59 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge stated that the use of
"one dubious inference to do double duty for two different crimes undermines the presump-
tion of innocence due an accused and interferes with the factfinding process." Id. at 759.
54. 744 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1984).
55. Id. at 390-91. Besides the crews of the shrimping vessels, Manbeck also involved a
land-based crew of truckers and loaders. The court affirmed the convictions of the land-
based crew on all counts, including participation in the conspiracy to distribute. Id. at 385
& n.38.
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into several trucks parked at the pier.5 6 The court upheld the crew
members' convictions for conspiracy to import.57 The Fourth
Circuit found that the jury could infer that the crews knew mari-
juana was aboard their vessels because of the enormous amount of
marijuana involved.58 The court also was willing to allow the jury
to infer that the crews participated in the conspiracy because of
their involvement in the operation and unloading of the vessels
and the unrebutted presumption that they knew their point of ori-
gin and destination.59 The court, however, dismissed the convic-
tions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute.6 0 The
court reasoned that the large quantity of marijuana supported the
inference that someone planned to distribute it, but not that the
crew was the "someone."' According to the court, the act of un-
loading marijuana into waiting trucks did not constitute participa-
tion in distribution of the marijuana; it merely completed the im-
portation conspiracy.2
The scope of the inferences which a jury can draw from posses-
sion of a large quantity of contraband constituted the heart of the
Fourth Circuit's opinion, and its conflict with the Fifth Circuit. In
56. Id. at 386. The principal evidence of importation included a navigational chart found
aboard one vessel, the lack of fishing gear aboard either vessel, and expert testimony regard-
ing the source of the contraband. The navigational chart was found near the steering wheel
of one vessel, and it bore ink dots and lines which indicated a path of travel from the Atlan-
tic Ocean into United States customs waters. Id. at 386; United States v. Manbeck, 526 F.
Supp. 1091, 1112 & n.26 (D.S.C. 1981). The opinion does not explain why an absence of
rigged fishing gear aboard a fishing vessel indicates importation, but not distribution. See
744 F.2d at 386. One possible explanation, however, is that the court viewed the evidence as
supporting an overall implication of criminal activity. The expert testimony indicated that
all waterborne smuggling into the coastal counties of South Carolina since 1975 involved
marijuana shipped out of Colombia. 526 F. Supp. at 1112.
57. 744 F.2d at 386-87.
58. Id. at 386.
59. Id. at 386-87. One co-conspirator testified that all of the crew members manned the
vessels and helped unload the marijuana. The co-conspirator also testified that each crew-
man on the vessel received a sum of money during the unloading, and that the entire crew
helped wash the vessel and rig the fishing gear after the unloading. Id.
60. Id. at 391.
61. Id. at 389.
62. Id. at 390.
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examining these inferences, the Fourth Circuit distinguished an in-
dividual's personal possession from a crew's possession in an im-
portation scheme6 3 The court recognized that when an individual
possesses more marijuana than he can consume, and he claims it is
for personal use, the fact finder may infer an intent to distribute."
According to the court, however, mere possession by a crew of a
large quantity of marijuana is insufficient to prove whether the
purpose of the conspiracy was mere importation or importation
and distribution combined. The crew members could have in-
tended to terminate their involvement after they completed impor-
tation. According to the Fourth Circuit, a court which presumes
that one who conspires to import a large quantity of contraband
also conspires to distribute it engages in circular reasoning because
the court presumes the ultimate fact in question.6 5
One judge dissented. The crucial issue, according to the dissent,
was whether the defendants intended to distribute the large quan-
tity of marijuana they possessed.6 The dissenting judge said that
because the defendants clearly had possessed the marijuana, and
because such a large quantity of marijuana had to be distributed, a
rational trier of fact could have concluded that the defendants also
intended to distribute the marijuana.6 According to the dissent,
the majority erred by assuming that the defendants must have in-
tended to take a personal role in the distribution to justify a con-
spiracy conviction.68 The dissenting judge emphasized that, on the
contrary, the Supreme Court's ruling in Pinkerton v. United
63. Id. at 389-90.
64. Id. at 389.
65. Id. at 389-90. The court conceded that its decision would have been different if the
crew members had possessed their own cache of contraband. Id.
66. Id. at 392 (Russell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. Id. at 392-93 (Russell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. Id. at 392 (Russell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissenting judge
implicitly rejected the majority's distinction between the facts of the case and a situation in
which the crew members had possessed their own cache of marijuana. See id. at 386. The
interpretation criticized by the dissenting judge is considered infra notes 89-100 and accom-
panying text.
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States69 that "acts of any conspirators in furtherance of the con-
spiracy may be attributed to all participants '70 firmly established
that the defendants should be criminally liable for the distribution
segment of the conspiracy if their intent to distribute can be estab-
lished at any point.7 1 The defendants' intent to distribute was evi-
denced by their knowledge of the distribution scheme, which could
be inferred from the size of the load, and the defendants' facilita-
tion of the scheme through importation and transfer of the mari-
juana.72 The dissenting judge expressly agreed with the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision in Michelena-Orovio, but he also asserted that the
facts in Manbeck established an even more compelling case for
connecting the distribution scheme to the importation because the
defendants were not foreigners and because they actually brought
the marijuana to the shores of the United States.73
THE ISSUES
Conspiracy to Import
The Fifth Circuit in Michelena-Orovio and the Fourth Circuit in
Manbeck agreed that the evidence in those cases was sufficient to
support the convictions for conspiracy to import.74 Both courts
69. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
70. Id. at 646-47 (quoted in Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 393 (Russell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)). In Pinkerton, two brothers, Walter and Daniel, were charged with vio-
lating the Internal Revenue Code. 328 U.S. at 641. The indictment contained several sub-
stantive counts and a conspiracy count. Both brothers were convicted on all counts, al-
though no evidence indicated that Daniel had participated directly in any of the substanive
offenses. Id. at 641, 645. Walter had committed the substantive offenses in furtherance of
the conspiracy. Id. The Court found that a continuous conspiracy had existed, and held that
"so long as the partnership in crime continues, the partners act for each other in carrying it
forward." Id. at 646. The Court explained that liability would not extend to all co-
conspirators if the substantive offense of one co-conspirator was not committed in further-
ance of the conspiracy or was not reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural conse-
quence of the unlawful agreement. Id. at 647-48.
71. Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 393 (Russell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 386-87; Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d at 743. Both courts applied
the general standard which requires the government to prove that a conspiracy existed, that
the defendant knew of the conspiracy, and that he joined it, to sustain a conspiracy convic-
tion. See United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067, 1074 n.4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 925 (1980) (cited in Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 386, 387, 390); United States v. Rodriguez,
585 F.2d 1234, 1245 (5th Cir. 1978), affd on reh'g en banc, 612 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1980),
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held that the enormous amount of marijuana on the vessels, twelve
tons in Michelena-Orouio and twenty-five tons in Manbeck, sup-
ported the inference that the crew members knew they were trans-
porting marijuana.75 In Michelena-Orovio, the Fifth Circuit also
noted that the defendant was arrested on a small vessel which was
reeking with the odor of marijuana. The vessel just had completed
aff'd sub nom. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981) (cited in Michelena-Orovio,
719 F.2d at 742).
75. Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 386; Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d at 743. The size of the load
was one of the three factors established by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Alfrey, 620
F.2d 551 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 938 (1980), to determine whether a crew had a
relationship to the contraband sufficient to support a conviction when a possessory relation-
ship and not mere presence on the scene was a prerequisite to conviction. See id. at 556.
The other two factors in Alfrey were the length of the voyage and the closeness of the
relationship between the crew and its captain. Id. Both the Fifth Circuit and the Fourth
Circuit cited Alfrey when they discussed the conspiracy to import issue, and both concluded
that the load size factor alone adequately supported the conclusion that the crew had a
sufficient relationship to the contraband to sustain a conviction for conspiracy to import.
See Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 386; Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d at 743.
The lower court in Manbeck had termed the relationship between the crews and the con-
traband "constructive possession"' because "each defendant exercised, or had the power to
exercise, dominion and control" over the marijuana and because "possession of a large
amount of marijuana among several people working together may be sufficient to show that
each has constructive possession." United States v. Manbeck, 526 F. Supp. 1091, 1113
(D.S.C. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, 744 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1984)
(footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Watkins, 662 F.2d 1090, 1097 (4th Cir. 1981)).
Courts sometimes use the constructive possession label when they want to hold an individ-
ual responsible for possession, but actual possession cannot be established. See Whitebread
& Stevens, Constructive Possession in Narcotics Cases: To Have and Have Not, 58 VA. L.
REv. 751, 761-62 (1972). The constructive possession theory is problematic, however, because
courts sometimes substitute the conclusory label for meaningful analysis. See id. at 758, 765.
The theory is even more problematic in the context of a maritime drug smuggling operation,
as opposed to a land-based operation, because the necessarily close relationship between all
participants in a maritime operation supports the notion of a joint venture, in which the
entire crew's relationship to the contraband is the important factor rather than any one
particular crew member's dominion and control over it. See United States v. Soto, 716 F.2d
989, 992 (2d Cir. 1983).
The Fourth Circuit's appellate consideration of Manbeck, as well as the Fifth Circuit's
consideration of Michelena-Orovio, circumvented the problems of constructive possession
by avoiding the issue entirely and focusing instead on the Alfrey factors. See Manbeck, 744
F.2d at 386; Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d at 743. The reliance on Alfrey and its emphasis on
the crew's knowledge of and interest in the contraband is entirely consistent with the sug-
gestion in Soto that the relationship between crew and contraband, rather than the extent
of the crew's dominion and control, is the appropriate focus. See Soto, 716 F.2d at 992.
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a lengthy voyage from Colombia and its sole cargo, marijuana, was
stowed in an unsecured hold. 6
Additionally, neither court had difficulty concluding that the de-
fendants knew they were going to import the cargo into the United
States. In Manbeck, the Fourth Circuit relied on an inference that
the crew knew the vessels' point of origin and destination." In
Michelena-Orovio, the Fifth Circuit noted that the vessel's naviga-
tion lights had been reversed, apparently to trick the Coast Guard
into thinking that the vessel was traveling away from the United
States instead of toward it.78 The vessel abruptly changed course
after its crew became aware of the Coast Guard vessel's presence.79
Both courts also relied on the crews' behavior during apprehen-
sion as evidence of their participation in the conspiracies to im-
port. Besides the reversal of navigation lights and abrupt course
change in Michelena-Orovio, the crew's resistance to repeated
Coast Guard attempts to board the vessel tended to show its par-
ticipation.80 The Fifth Circuit also noted that when the Coast
Guard officials ultimately came aboard, the crew members were
waiting on the vessel's deck with their suitcases packed as if they
anticipated arrest.8' The crew members each insisted that the ves-
sel had no captain,82 indicating either that they knew of the cap-
tain's greater criminal liability and sought to protect him or that
they all had an equal interest in the contraband. The Fourth Cir-
cuit in Manbeck also had no trouble establishing the crews' partici-
pation in the conspiracy to import. In Manbeck, the crews had
navigated their vessels to a clandestine spot where they unloaded
the contraband.83 When the Customs agents boarded the vessels,
76. Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d at 743.
77. Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 386. In its consideration of the related charge of actual importa-
tion, see supra note 25, the court also noted that Customs agents searching one of the ves-
sels had found "a navigational chart ... marked so as to indicate a path of travel extending
deep into Customs waters." 744 F.2d at 386; see supra note 56.
78. Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d at 743.
79. Id.
80. Id. In fact, the crew refused to stop until the Coast Guard ship disabled the ves-
sel. Id. at 741.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 367, 386.
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they found that the decks recently had been washed down to re-
move the marijuana residue . 4 This evidence, according to the
court, was sufficient to establish the crews' participation in the
conspiracy to import.8 5
Conspiracy to Distribute
The Fifth and Fourth Circuits disagreed strongly, however, con-
cerning whether a jury can infer a crew's criminal liability for dis-
tribution of the marijuana solely from the quantity of marijuana
imported.8 6 Without evidence of the crew's specific intent to dis-
tribute the contraband, the Fourth Circuit characterized the un-
loading of the cargo from the vessels into the waiting land vehicles
only as completion of importation, regardless of the size of the
shipment.8 7 The Fifth Circuit, however, treated the loading from
one vessel to another as part of the distribution scheme, ruling
that a jury could infer an intent to distribute because the size of
the shipment was more than the crew could consume.8 Measured
by the language of the governing statutes, their legislative histo-
ries, and relevant case law, the Fifth Circuit approach is vastly
superior.
Application of Statutory Definitions
The language of the distribution conspiracy statute favors the
Fifth Circuit's approach, whether the crew unloads the contraband
into waiting land vehicles, as in Manbeck, or it unloads the contra-
band onto another vessel, as in Michelena-Orovio. The statute
states that "it shall be unlawful . . . to . . . possess with intent to
. . . distribute . . . a controlled substance" such as marijuana.8 9
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Compare Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 390 (rejecting contention in Michelena-Orovio that
participation in conspiracy to distribute can be inferred from large quantity imported), with
Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d at 752 (involvement in conspiracy to import large quantity of
marijuana permits inference of conspiracy to distribute). See supra notes 30-44, 60-62 and
accompanying text.
87. See Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 390; supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
88. See Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d at 749-52; supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
89. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982). Commonly, drug statutes are drafted to punish mere
possession because possession is easier to prove than distribution. See Whitebread & Ste-
vens, supra note 75, at 754. The federal statute proscribes both possession, 21 U.S.C. § 844
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The standard of proof required to establish the intent to distribute
must be examined in light of two statutory definitions. To "dis-
tribute" means "to deliver .. .a controlled substance." 90 "Deliv-
ery," in turn, means "the actual, constructive, or attempted trans-
fer of a controlled substance." 91
When the Fifth Circuit applied these definitions, it concluded
that the unloading of marijuana from one vessel to another consti-
tuted distribution because it was "delivery" of a controlled sub-
stance. To support this interpretation, the Fifth Circuit relied on
its decision in United States v. Pool.92 In Pool, the court held that
the planned transfer of marijuana from the mother ship to off-load
boats 250 miles east-southeast of Jacksonville, Florida constituted
"distribution as contemplated by 21 U.S.C. § 802(11)."'' 9 Similarly,
the court reasoned that by unloading the marijuana from a vessel
into waiting trucks, the crews in Manbeck transferred a controlled
substance, thus "delivering" it within the statutory meaning of
"distribution."
At least four circuits adhere to the Fifth Circuit's literal statu-
tory interpretation. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit has stated that a person "makes a knowing and in-
telligent distribution ... when he knowingly transfers the con-
trolled substance. 9 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit agreed, noting that "the Controlled Substances Act
...contains no sale or buying requirement to support a convic-
tion; there is now an offense of participation in the transaction
viewed as a whole. . . .Activities in furtherance of the ultimate
sale-such as vouching for the quality of the drugs, negotiating for
or receiving the price, and supplying or delivering the drug-are
(1982), and possession with the intent to distribute, id. § 841(a)(1). Simple possession is a
misdemeanor, see id. § 844, but possession with the intent to distribute is a felony, see id.
§ 841(b).
90. 21 U.S.C. § 802(11) (1982).
91. Id. § 802(8).
92. 660 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981).
93. Id. at 560 (quoted in Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d at 754).
94. United States v. King, 567 F.2d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub. nom. Lewis
v. United States, 435 U.S. 945 (1978). The Eighth Circuit in King explicitly noted that "[a]
controlled substance is delivered when it is 'transferred,' whether the transfer is actual, con-
structive, or attempted." Id. at 790-91.
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sufficient to establish distribution.""5 The Ninth Circuit and the
D.C. Circuit also have followed the Fifth Circuit's statutory inter-
pretation, at least by implication.9" If the Fourth Circuit had fol-
lowed the Fifth Circuit's statutory approach, it would have found
that the crews' furtherance of the actual distribution in Manbeck
established the intent to distribute.97
The Fourth Circuit reached a conflicting conclusion in Manbeck
not because it rejected the Fifth Circuit's interpretation, but be-
cause it read an ownership requirement into the statute. The
Fourth Circuit conceded that it would have found an intent to dis-
tribute if a particular crew member had possessed his own cache of
marijuana.98 This reasoning ignores not only the statutory lan-
guage, but also the clear legislative intent to prohibit possession of
contraband regardless of any ownership interest. Although the
charge of distribution might require proof that the crew member
personally made the physical transfer, the charge of possession
with the intent to distribute requires proof only that the crew
member intended, planned, or anticipated that someone would
transfer the marijuana from his possession and into that of an-
other.99 Congress did not intend to allow a smuggler who in-
structed others to handle marijuana but did not assert ownership
rights over it to avoid penalties designed to punish and discourage
the unauthorized movement of marijuana. By reading an owner-
ship requirement into the statute, the Fourth Circuit diluted Con-
gress' specific intent to prosecute individuals who possess contra-
band for illegal purposes. 100
95. United States v. Wigley, 627 F.2d 224, 226 (10th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted) (quot-
ing United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1973)).
96. See United States v. Mehrmanesh, 682 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir. 1982) ("By punishing
deliveries rather than transactions, Congress has made it unnecessary to establish that a
defendant participated in a transaction as either a buyer or a seller, thus expanding the
scope of the Act to parties who act merely as agent for the buyer or seller."); United States
v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (by implication; see United States v. Pool, 660 F.2d
547, 561 (5th Cir. 1981)).
97. See United States v. Wigley, 627 F.2d 224, 226 (10th Cir. 1980).
98. Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 390.
99. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
100. See H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note 17, at 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 4577 (stating that the "quantity of a drug found in the possession of a person"
bears on the issue of whether the purpose of possession is personal use or illicit transactions
(emphasis added)). Because the statute focuses on possession, the report did not discuss the
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The Fourth Circuit also misapplied the statutory definition of
"importation" when it characterized the unloading of the cargo as
only the completion of importation and not as participation in the
distribution. 101 The statute defines "importation" as "any bringing
in or introducing of such article into any area.' 10 2 The United
States, including the customs territory, is the area into which im-
portation of controlled substances is prohibited. 03 Under this defi-
nition, importation occurred in Manbeck when the crews sailed the
vessels into United States waters. When the crews later sailed into
the inland waterways and rivers, importation was a completed ac-
complishment, and distribution became the immediate objective.
Any movement of the marijuana within the territory of the United
States constituted preparation for distribution rather than comple-
tion of importation because once "in the area" the marijuana could
not later be "imported." The Fourth Circuit's assertion to the con-
trary was erroneous.
With respect to the crew members who helped unload marijuana
onto conveyors and into trucks, the fact that the distribution stat-
ute forbids "transfer" also supports a conclusion that the crew
members were distributing the marijuana, and not merely complet-
ing importation as the Fourth Circuit asserted. With the exception
of two Fifth Circuit cases decided before Michelena-Orovio,0 4 the
courts never have required proof that crew members were involved
in further sale or transport of the contraband to land-based retail-
ers and users to support a conviction for conspiracy to distribute.
concept of ownership. This focus is consistent with the way drug statutes usually are
drafted. Drug statutes generally focus on possession because possession is easier to prove
than distribution. See Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 75, at 754; supra note 89.
The Fourth Circuit's departure from the emphasis on possession in the statute and in the
Fifth Circuit cases starkly contrasts with its treatment of the possession issue in the con-
spiracy to import charge. In considering that charge, the Fourth Circuit followed the Fifth
Circuit's conclusion in Michelena-Orovio and in United States v. Alfrey that the mere size
of the load was adequate evidence of a relationship between the crew and the contraband
sufficient to support a conviction. See supra note 75.
101. See Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 390.
102. 21 U.S.C. § 951(a)(1) (1982).
103. Id. § 952. Customs waters are defined as waters within four leagues (twelve nautical
miles) of the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) (1982).
104. United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Rodriguez,
585 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 612 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1980), affd sub
nom. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
[Vol. 27:217
MARITIME DRUG SMUGGLING CONSPIRACIES
Recognizing that the narrow definition of "distribution" which this
view implies was not supported by the statute, the Fifth Circuit in
Michelena-Orovio overruled both contrary cases. 105
Inferences Possible From the Amount of Contraband
A primary indicator of a crew's intent to distribute contraband is
the quantity of the contraband. In drug cases, courts generally per-
mit juries to infer intent to distribute if the defendant possessed
more marijuana than he could consume. 106 In maritime drug
smuggling cases, three other circuits have followed the Fifth Cir-
cuit's lead in Michelena-Orovio by allowing a jury to infer a crew's
intent to distribute solely from the size of the load.10 7 The Fourth
Circuit, on the other hand, has refused to permit a jury to infer
intent to distribute from the load size alone. 08
In refusing to permit an inference of intent to distribute from
the size of the load, the Fourth Circuit stated that courts originally
developed an inference based on quantity to distinguish simple
possession from possession with intent to distribute in domestic
drug trafficking cases. 0 9 According to the Fourth Circuit, quantity
is irrelevant in maritime trafficking cases because courts are at-
tempting to distinguish between importation and distribution. 110
The Fourth Circuit's characterization of this distinction, however,
105. See Michelena-Oroujo, 719 F.2d at 757.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 452 F.2d 569, 573 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 910 (1972) ("The large quantity of material in the can considered together with the
expert testimony concerning the methods of ingesting hallucinogens ... warranted an infer-
ence of an intent to sell." (footnote omitted)); United States v. Ortiz, 445 F.2d 1100, 1104-05
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 993 (1971) ("We hold that the quantity of drugs found in
Ortiz's possession established his purpose to sell, deliver or otherwise dispose of the
drugs."); United States v. Cerrito, 413 F.2d 1270, 1273 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1004 (1970) ("We think the evidence as to quantity of tablets possessed and sold is sufficient
to justify the inference that the tablets were neither for personal use of, or for administering
to a dog owned by Cerrito.").
107. See United States v. Lopez, 709 F.2d 742, 744 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 861
(1983) (vessel seized off the Massachusetts coast with approximately fourteen tons of mari-
juana aboard); United States v. Miller, 693 F.2d 1051, 1054 (11th Cir. 1982) (vessel seized off
the Florida coast with approximately one ton of marijuana aboard); United States v. Allen,
675 F.2d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981) (vessel seized off the
Oregon coast after crew unloaded approximately seventeen tons of marijuana).
108. Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 390.
109. Id. at 389.
110. Id.
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is erroneous. In maritime cases, courts are not attempting to dis-
tinguish importation from distribution but rather personal use
from distribution,"' because the amount of contraband a crew
member possesses is irrelevant to a charge of importation. The
amount imported can be an ounce or a ton." 2
In finding the crew members in Manbeck guilty of a conspiracy
to import, the Fourth Circuit necessarily concluded that the crews
had knowledge of and interest in the marijuana that they intended
to bring into the United States."" With this interest established,
the court should have asked whether the crew members intended
to exercise their interest in the marijuana for personal use or for
distribution. At this point in the analysis, the importation issue
becomes irrelevant.
Viewed from this perspective, a land-based defendant who pos-
sesses a large quantity of marijuana in a container is no different
from a crew member on a marijuana-laden boat floating on United
States waters. If a land-based defendant possesses more marijuana
than he personally could use, common sense and case law dictate
that the only possible intention he could have for such a large
quantity would be distribution of at least a portion. A crew mem-
ber who sails on a vessel loaded with more marijuana than the
crew could consume is no different, because the crew must intend
to transfer at least some of the marijuana to others. The Fourth
Circuit, therefore, should have concentrated on the amount of ma-
rijuana involved, not the importation/distribution distinction.
The Fourth Circuit's position in Manbeck also is inconsistent
with its own decisions involving crews that did not actually import
contraband. In United States v. Watkins,1 4 for example, a federal
agent discovered a fishing vessel navigating in United States wa-
ters near the site of a recent drug transfer. The vessel aroused the
agent's suspicion because it was running at night without lights, it
111. See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668, 670 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 994 (1981) (noting that "'[t]he very size of a ... cache can be sufficient to show intent
to distribute'" and that the 22,500 pounds of marijuana found in the possession of the
defendants was "far too much for the personal consumption of four individuals.").
112. See 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(2) (1982); infra note 124 and accompanying text.
113. The Court, however, stopped short of terming that interest either actual or construc-
tive possession. See supra note 75.
114. 662 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
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sped up when ordered to stop, and it had no fishing gear aboard.
The crew also was washing marijuana residue off the deck.115 Al-
though the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of impor-
tation, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a conviction of conspiracy to
possess marijuana with intent to distribute.116 Similarly, in United
States v. Laughman,117 a crew unloaded marijuana from its vessel
into smaller vessels under cover of night and within United States
territorial waters.11 8 No evidence indicated that the crew actually
had imported the contraband.119 The Fourth Circuit nevertheless
affirmed the crew members' convictions for possession of mari-
juana with intent to distribute.1 0 Objectively, the crews' actions in
Manbeck cannot be distinguished from the actions in Watkins and
Laughman. In Manbeck, however, the court required stronger evi-
dence of intent to distribute only because proof was available that
the crew actually had imported the marijuana. 2' This additional
requirement cannot be supported by prior case law or by reason-
ing. The Fourth Circuit should have permitted the jury to infer
intent to distribute solely from the size of the load, as the Fifth
Circuit did in Michelena-Orovio.
Legislative History
The legislative history of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Act of 1970122 also supports the Fifth Circuit's
interpretation. For example, the importation statute prohibits ille-
gal importation regardless of the quantity of contraband in-
volved. 23 The maximum punishment for importation varies with
the type of controlled substance involved, not the quantity.124 In
115. Id. at 1097.
116. Id. at 1096-98.
117. 618 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980).
118. Id. at 1074-75.
119. See id. at 1072 n.2.
120. Id. at 1078.
121. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
122. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-969
(1982)).
123. See 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(2) (1982); supra note 112 and accompanying text.
124. See 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(2) (1982). For example, if the importation involved a narcotic
drug listed in schedule I or II, the maximum punishment is fifteen years in jail and a
$25,000 fine. If the importation involved a controlled substance other than a narcotic drug
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contrast, the punishment in the statute prohibiting possession with
intent to distribute varies according to the quantity of contraband
possessed.125 This penalty structure indicates that Congress did
not intend punishment for importation to preclude punishment for
distribution. After importation is established, the Court must in-
quire whether the purpose of the importation was personal use or
distribution. 126 Each purpose may be punished to a different de-
gree of severity, with the punishment for importation determined
by the type of contraband imported and the punishment for distri-
bution determined by the amount involved. 127
The Fifth Circuit, however, relied not on the legislative history
accompanying the penalty structure but on Congress' general in-
tent to tighten the screws on drug smuggling by making it too
risky.'2 " Based on this legislative history, the court concluded that
Congress must have intended the defendants to be prosecuted for
both conspiracy to import and conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute. 129 Congress' inadvertent repeal of the provision which
prohibited possession of contraband on United States vessels on
the high seas,130 which required prosecutors to prove that crew
listed in schedule I or H, the maximum punishment is five years in jail and a $15,000 fine.
See id.
125. See id. § 841(b)(1)(B), (b)(6). For example, a court can impose the maximum pen-
alty of fifteen years in jail and a $125,000 fine only if the defendant possessed more than
1000 pounds of marijuana. Id. § 841(b)(6). If 1000 pounds or less were involved, the maxi-
mum punishment is five years in jail and a $15,000 fine. See id. § 841(b)(1)(B).
126. The legislative history of the statute specifically indicates that Congress intended the
quantity of the drug found in the defendant's possession to bear on the question of whether
the possession was for personal use or for distribution. H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note 17, at
12, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4577; see supra note 100.
127. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. One commentator, however, has sug-
gested that when Congress set the punishment for smuggling drugs, it was aware that smug-
glers encourage retail sales of the drugs they smuggle. Based on this theory, this commenta-
tor asserted that the punishment for importation probably incorporates the punishment for
facilitating distribution. Johnson, supra note 2, at 1150.
128. See HR. REP. No. 1444, supra note 17, at 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS
at 4567; Hearings, supra note 17, at 196 (statement of Richard Nixon, President of the
United States).
129. See Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d at 754.
130. See H.R. REP. No. 323, supra note 1, at 4-5; supra notes 1, 15 and accompanying
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members not only possessed marijuana but also intended to dis-
tribute it in the United States, created some doubt as to the seri-
ousness of Congress' intent to crack down on drug smuggling. In
the 1980 amendments to the drug laws, however, Congress reaf-
firmed its intent by prohibiting possession on the high seas and
imposing a maximum penalty of fifteen years imprisonment, which
is identical to the penalty imposed for importation. 131 Given Con-
gress' reaffirmed intent, according to the Fifth Circuit, separation
of the importation and distribution offenses in a manner which
causes foreign nationals caught smuggling drugs on the high seas to
be punished less severely than they would have been punished
before Congress separated the offenses cannot be justified.'32
The Fourth Circuit conceded that the combination of conspiracy
to import and conspiracy to distribute convictions for the same de-
fendant does not raise the specter of double jeopardy.'33 The
Fourth Circuit cited the United States Supreme Court's ruling in
Albernaz v. United States3 4 that a conviction for conspiracy to
distribute requires the proof of a fact that a conviction for conspir-
acy to import does not, and vice versa.135 Based on Albernaz, the
Fourth Circuit characterized the drug smuggling operation as "a
single conspiracy with dual criminal objectives."' 36
In its subsequent analysis, however, the Fourth Circuit lost sight
both of the "proof of fact" identified in Albernaz as distinguishingimportation from distribution and of its characterization of the
Manbeck drug smuggling conspiracy as unitary in nature. The
131. Act of Sept. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 881, 955a-955d, 960, 962 (1982). The new statute was added to facilitate enforce-
ment of drug laws on the high seas. See S. REP. No. 855, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted
in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 2785, 2785-86. Although many of the new provisions
were intended to facilitate jurisdiction over foreign flag vessels, the new statute which pro-
hibits possession on the high seas applies to "any vessel." See 21 U.S.C. § 955a(b) (1982).
132. See Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d at 754.
133. Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 388.
134. 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
135. Id. at 339 (cited in Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 388).
136. Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 387.
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Fourth Circuit characterized as "circular" the Fifth Circuit's rea-
soning that a crew member who imported a large quantity of mari-
juana must have intended to distribute it, 137 even though it recog-
nized that the Fifth Circuit had not held that participation in an
importation conspiracy makes one automatically guilty of partici-
pation in a distribution conspiracy. 138 The Fourth Circuit could not
have characterized the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in this way if it
had heeded its own citation of the holding in Albernaz that convic-
tion for conspiracy to distribute requires proof of a fact that a con-
viction for conspiracy to import does not."3 9 The presence of a
quantity of marijuana too large for the crew to consume is the one
fact necessary to prove conspiracy to distribute that is not neces-
sary to prove conspiracy to import.140 The Fourth Circuit should
have inquired, as the Fifth Circuit did, whether the crew members'
intent to distribute could have been inferred from their possession
of a large quantity of marijuana. Their prior participation in the
conspiracy to import was relevant only because it demonstrated
the crew members' interest in and relationship to the marijuana.
The Fourth Circuit's unwillingness to rely on the crews' partici-
pation in the operation of the vessels to demonstrate the crews'
joinder in the distribution conspiracy as well as the importation
conspiracy also conflicts with its characterization of the operation
as "a single conspiracy with dual criminal objectives," based on
language from Albernaz.142 Apparently, the Fourth Circuit requires
137. Id. at 390.
138. See id. at 388.
139. See supra note 135.
140. See supra notes 106-07, 111-21 and accompanying text. A crew member can be con-
victed of participation in a conspiracy to import simply by proof that he sailed on a vessel
which crossed into the United States bearing marijuana and that he knew the marijuana
was on board, regardless of the quantity involved. See 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(2) (1982); supra
notes 112, 124 and accompanying text. Although the presence of a large quantity of mari-
juana may be helpful in proving that a crew member knew the marijuana was on board, see
Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 386; Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d at 743; supra note 75, the large
quantity is not essential to prove the conspiracy to import. The fact that the penalty for
distribution varies with the quantity involved, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(6), but the penalty for
importation does not, see id. § 960(b), also indicates the centrality of the amount involved
to the distribution charge but not the importation charge. See supra notes 124-25 and ac-
companying text.
141. See Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 390; supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
142. Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 387; see supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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that the importation conspiracy end before the distribution con-
spiracy can begin. Under this interpretation, the crew members
must participate in activities subsequent to sailing the vessel or
unloading the cargo before they can be guilty of a conspiracy to
distribute. If the conspiracy in Manbeck was a single agreement
with dual criminal Objectives, as the Fourth Circuit characterized
it, the defendants should have had to join the conspiracy only
once. 143 They should not have had to complete the entire importa-
tion operation before they could agree to enter the distribution
conspiracy, as the Fourth Circuit's interpretation would require.
FITTING THE PUNISHMENT TO THE CRIME
In maritime drug smuggling operations, some members play a
greater role and consequently share greater profits. Crew members
who are paid upon delivery do not share in profits from distribu-
tion of marijuana on the streets, and clearly have a lesser stake in
the overall operation. Manbeck can be viewed as an attempt to re-
spond to this problem by distinguishing between the various mem-
bers of the operation and punishing the less serious offenders for
only one statutory violation rather than two. 44
Congress clearly intended that both the "lowly Columbian sea-
man" 45 and the mastermind of the operation should be held liable
143. Even if the transaction is analyzed as two separate conspiracies, the crew members
likely assented to both conspiracies simultaneously by boarding a ship destined for the
United States and loaded with more marijuana than was necessary for the personal con-
sumption of the crew. See supra notes 75, 106-07, 111-21 and accompanying text.
144. Viewed in this manner, the apparent conflict between Manbeck and other Fourth
Circuit cases such as United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 925 (1980); see supra notes 114-121 and accompanying text, can be explained. In
Laughman, the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendants for conspiracy to import.
See 618 F.2d at 1072 n.2; supra note 119 and accompanying text. The conviction for con-
spiracy to distribute, see 618 F.2d at 1078; supra note 120 and accompanying text, was the
only way to punish the defendants for their drug smuggling activities. In Manbeck, on the
other hand, the evidence of conspiracy to import was sufficient to support conviction. See
Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 386-87. Conspiracy to import and conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute both are punishable by fifteen years in jail. See supra notes 22-25 and
accompanying text. If the Fourth Circuit had upheld both convictions, the defendants would
have been subject to up to thirty years in jail for conduct which was not serious as the
conduct of the land-based leaders of the operation and was more closely analogous to the
conduct of the defendants in Laughman.
145. See Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d at 752.
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for both importation and distribution.'46 Congress may not have
intended, however, to make both classes of conspirators serve iden-
tical sentences. Both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits recognized that
some defendants have had no contact with the United States and
have participated no further than unloading the boat.147 These de-
fendants certainly are not as culpable as a "kingpin" who arranged
an operation from the United States. These differences in culpabil-
ity, however, should affect only the severity of the sentence, not
the determination of criminal liability.
Courts legitimately can differentiate between members of a con-
spiracy by exercising their discretion to impose less than the maxi-
mum sentence upon certain defendants, to impose concurrent
rather than consecutive sentences, to suspend sentences, and to
impose probation. Congress also could revise the penalty structure
to allow the courts to respond more accurately to varying degrees
of culpability among different members of a conspiracy. 14 The
courts, however, should not use findings concerning criminal liabil-
ity to respond to perceived differences in culpability, as the Fourth
Circuit did in Manbeck.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits apply the same analysis in mari-
time drug smuggling cases to determine whether a conspiracy to
import existed. Their approach to whether a conspiracy to dis-
tribute also existed, however, differs considerably. The Fifth Cir-
cuit's approach in Michelena-Orovio is vastly superior.
The Fifth Circuit, along with four other circuits, has applied the
statutory language faithfully-especially the definition of "distri-
bution" as any "transfer." The Fourth Circuit in Manbeck misap-
plied the statute by adding an ownership element to the possession
146. See id. at 752-54.
147. See Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 387-88; Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d at 752.
148. For example, Congress could add a new section to the possession with intent to dis-
tribute statute to impose a much stiffer penalty if the marijuana is imported. This new
provision would focus the most severe punishments upon those involved in the later stages
of the distribution scheme.
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offense and by considering the delivery of contraband as comple-
tion of importation, not distribution, even though statutory impor-
tation occurred when the contraband entered United States terri-
tory. The Fifth Circuit approach also is superior because it allows a
jury to infer an intent to distribute solely from the size of the
cache, in conformity with six other circuits. The Fourth Circuit's
requirement of other evidence to establish an intent to distribute
in importation cases is inconsistent with its own decisions in other
waterborne distribution cases, in which no additional evidence was
required simply because importation could not be proved. The
statutory penalty structure and the legislative history also demon-
strate a congressional intent supporting the Fifth Circuit's ap-
proach. Because Congress provided penalties for importation that
do not vary with load size; and penalties for possession with intent
to distribute that do, it probably intended that after a conspiracy
to import has been punished, the associated conspiracy to possess
with the intent to distribute also should be punished according to
the size of the load. The legislative history of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 also indicates that
Congress intended to make penalties for participation in drug traf-
ficking prohibitive. The Fifth Circuit approach is consistent with
that purpose because it upholds the plain meaning of the statutory
language by maximizing the maritime drug smuggler's exposure to
criminal liability.
If the Fourth Circuit wanted to adjust the punishments of the
defendants in Manbeck, it should have done so through other
available devices such as discretionary sentencing. Its use of deter-
minations of criminal liability, however, conflicts with the statu-
tory language, the legislative history, and the Fourth Circuit's own
case law. The Fourth Circuit should abandon this approach and
follow the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Michelena-Orovio allowing a
jury to infer an intent to distribute merely from the size of the
cache.
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